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Why did socialist economies fail? 
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ABSTRACT   
We present new estimates for investment and new growth accounts for three socialist 
economies between 1950 and 1989. Government statistics reported distorted measures for 
both the rate and trajectory of productivity growth in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
Poland. Researchers have since benefited from revised output data but continued to use 
official statistics on capital input, or estimated capital stock from official investment data. 
Investment levels and rates of capital accumulation were much lower than officially claimed 
and over-reporting worsened over time. A setback in factor accumulation, both equipment 
investment and labour input, contributed significantly to the socialist growth failure of the 
1980s. 
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The relative economic decline of Eastern Europe after 1945 has been linked to institutional failure. The 
inefficiency of central planning compared to the market economy is well established both theoretically 
and empirically.1 Socialism, it has been argued, was relatively successful in mobilizing resources but 
stifled innovation and entrepreneurship. Planned economies thus achieved ‘a satisfactory productivity 
performance in the era of mass production, but could not adapt to the requirements of flexible 
production technology’, which contributed to their collapse in the 1980s.2 They maintained high labour 
participation and invested heavily in physical capital but were inefficient compared to western market 
economies in their use of production factors and intermediate inputs.3 
We do not refute that the planned economy was inefficient, but the above characterization of the 
socialist growth experience requires revision. As the literature review will show, the majority of existing 
growth accounts demonstrated productivity failure in socialist economies. We consider these results 
biased by the inconsistent use of data on output and factor inputs. Researchers benefited from revised 
data on national income that yielded more modest growth rates than what government statistics implied, 
but they continued to use official data on capital formation. Under central planning, investment statistics 
are difficult to trust. We show that socialist economies invested considerably less in physical capital 
than previously claimed. Likewise, employment statistics overstate the growth of labour input as 
average work hours declined over time. We suggest a greater role for factor inputs and a smaller one 
for productivity in the relative decline of Eastern Europe. Moving beyond Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP), we demonstrate an accumulation failure during the last decade of communism. Our findings 
imply fundamental differences between the growth experience of small socialist countries and what we 
know from the accounts of the Soviet economy over the same period. 
We reconstruct investment series for the aggregate economy in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
Poland from 1950 to 1989 and derive capital accumulation from these estimates. We adjust employment 
for changes in average work hours and educational attainment. We then use these new data on factor 
inputs to establish new growth accounts. Weighted input growth in all three countries began to slow 
down in the 1960s and in Hungary and Poland turned negative after 1980. Labour-productivity growth 
remained respectable until the fall of communism, even though structural change had an adverse effect 
on productivity during the 1980s. Average rates of TFP growth fell considerably after the postwar 
golden age. However, their continued decline after 1980 was much less dramatic. All three economies 
ran out of steam not so much because of diminishing rates of productivity growth but mainly because 
of inadequate factor accumulation.  
Technological inefficiencies contributed to this growth retardation, but focusing only on them 
paints an incomplete picture. External shocks affecting both the supply of imports and public spending 
on investment projects played a very important role, too. They invoked austerity policies that ignited 
                                                 
1 For a general summary see Eichengreen, European economy, chapters 5 and 10. 
2
 Broadberry and Klein, ‘When and why’, p.37. 
3
 Bergson, ‘Comparative productivity’; Van Ark, ‘Convergence’. 
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public discontent and undermined the economic legitimacy of communism. Two such shocks hit 
Eastern Europe simultaneously. Firstly, rising oil prices made socialist industries less competitive 
because they applied energy-intensive technologies, while fuel imports became more expensive. 
Secondly, refinancing their external debt, which had expanded throughout the 1970s, was more costly 
as western creditor nations raised interest rates to combat inflation at home. Socialist governments 
responded by limiting imports and by reducing international borrowing. Consequently, even where 
GDP continued to grow, domestic absorption stagnated or declined. Scarce resources were allocated to 
consumption and social infrastructure to satisfy popular demands. Thus equipment investment became 
the victim of austerity. Insufficient machinery investment, in turn, thwarted both technological 
modernization and employment creation. Labour input declined further with shorter official workweeks 
and popular welfare measures that reduced female labour participation. 
Our growth accounts bring the experience of East Central Europe after the postwar golden age 
closer to what the literature has described for developing regions following their flirtation with import-
substituting industrialization. By contrast, it differs from what we know about the Soviet economy, 
which was hampered by the wasteful allocation of resources that the boom in hydrocarbons mobilised. 
The crisis of the 1980s in East Central Europe was not idiosyncratic and did not result from the 
inefficiencies attributed to the socialist system. This does not mean that technological or allocation 
inefficiencies can be refuted; indeed there is plentiful evidence for their existence. But, they are not the 
sole reason for the loss of momentum in economic growth after 1980; insufficient factor accumulation 
was equally important, if not more. 
After a brief literature review, we discuss the data and describe our methodology to estimate 
investment and capital stock in section II. Section III reports our new estimates, compares the imputed 
investment ratios across countries, and contrasts these with data on Southern European economies. In 
section IV, we reconstruct the aggregate growth accounts of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and 
discuss the role of structural change. Section V explains the crisis of the 1980s, before section VI 
concludes. In the supplementary online material, Appendix I describes the sources we used to 
reconstruct investment. We report investment and capital stock by year in Appendix II and robustness 
checks in Appendix III. 
 
I 
The theory of socialist development reaches back to the Marxian extended reproduction. Feldman 
formalized this concept and alongside Preobrazhensky stressed the role of the state in accumulating 
resources for investment.4
 Primary socialist accumulation was used to justify state intervention in late-
developing nations, as it ‘provided for lacking prerequisites’.5 
                                                 
4
 Feldman, ‘Theory’, p. 312; Preobrazhensky, ‘Primary socialist accumulation’, pp. 235-40. 
5
 Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness. Pp. 359-60. 
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Even though recent scholarship has downplayed the role of economic motives behind the Stalinist 
industrialisation program6, Allen reinterpreted Soviet industrialization in the 1930s as ‘Feldman and 
Preobrazhensky in action’. Centralized resource allocation with the simultaneous application of output 
planning and soft budget constraints favoured heavy industry.7 Earlier, Nurkse had posited that, capital 
accumulation in poor countries generated rapid growth through the reallocation of inefficiently 
employed farm labour into industry. High rates of investment yielded fast growth as long as this labour 
surplus was not absorbed.8 Common to these interpretations is that they did not define the role of 
technology and did not specifically acknowledge the limits of extensive growth. Horvat was among the 
first to introduce diminishing returns into the theory of socialist development, with the capacity to 
absorb new capital limited by the supply of labour.9  
The failure of socialist economies has been blamed on the neglect of technological progress and 
inefficient investment.10 These factors were complemented by the high and growing material intensity 
of production. State enterprises operating with soft budget constraints maximized their investment 
allocations and intermediate inputs regardless of the expected returns. This evolved into a shortage 
economy, in which profit maximization was replaced by resource hunger that undermined productivity 
and innovation.11 Shortages emerging from poor allocation are believed to have become more disruptive 
as planned economies modernized. Grey markets emerged to satisfy increasingly complex consumer 
demands and to reallocate intermediate inputs between firms.12 Input-output data indicated that, on 
average, the material intensity of production was higher in socialist countries than in western market 
economies and that this gap widened after the mid-1970s.13 
Krugman articulated the dominant view on planned development, suggesting that authoritarian 
growth was unsustainable in the long run.14 Early success, he argued, came from ‘perspiration’ (factor 
accumulation), followed by an inevitable slowdown because of the lack of ‘inspiration’ (innovation and 
creative entrepreneurship). Krugman’s characterization of the East Asian growth miracles as the 
product of neoclassical transition dynamics received support from quantitative research15, but has since 
been convincingly refuted. Official statistics overstated capital accumulation; TFP contributed strongly 
to the catching up of newly industrialized countries between 1960 and 1990.16  
                                                 
6
 See Kontorovich, ‘Military origins’. 
7
 Allen, ‘Capital accummulation’, pp. 7-16; Allen, Farm to factory, ch. 8-9. 
8
 Nurske, Problems 
9
 Horvat, Towards a theory. Marxists economists saw capital accumulation as the main driver of development 
and focused on the capital-output ratio, as in the Harrod-Domar model, rather than joint factor productivity (see 




 Kornai, ‘The Hungarian reforms’, pp. 140-5. 
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 Banerjee and Spagat, ‘Productivity paralysis’.  
13
 Gomulka and Rostowski, ‘International comparison’, pp. 481-2, 488. 
14
 Krugman, ‘The myth’ 
15
 Mankiw, ‘Growth of nations’; Young, ‘Tyranny of numbers’ 
16
 Hsieh, ‘What explains’ 
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By contrast, extensive growth remained the mainstream interpretation of socialist development. 
Most research conducted on the USSR and Central Europe reported high productivity growth for the 
1950s and, in some cases, the 1960s, followed by rapid deceleration. For the Soviet economy, most 
studies found negative TFP growth during the late 1970s and 1980s.17 Brada applied a frontier 
production function to examine Eastern European manufacturing performance between 1960 and 1985 
and confirmed the declining rate of TFP growth, especially after 1980.18  
This conventional story of productivity failure is, at least in part, the product of statistical illusion. 
Growth accounts derived entirely from official statistics on both output and factor inputs suggested no 
such failure; instead constant or increasing rates of TFP growth until the early 1980s.19 Signs of a 
productivity meltdown emerged from subsequent research that benefited from revised national income 
data but that continued to use official statistics on capital accumulation or estimated capital stock from 
inflated official investment data. New cross-country evidence has only made good on these 
shortcomings in part. The last version of the Penn World Tables (PWT) to include all socialist countries 
reported investment ratios of almost or above thirty per cent across Eastern Europe throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s.20 Recent updates of the PWT suggest dramatically lower investment rates for some of the 
former socialist countries, thanks to the introduction of post-1990 benchmarks based on market prices, 
but still report high rates of capital accumulation and zero, or even negative, TFP growth for the 1980s.21 
We demonstrate that, in addition to productivity, factor inputs played a prominent role in the 
relative decline of socialist economies. Rather than recording modest growth rates despite very high 
levels of investment, Central European countries fell behind, in large part, because they invested much 
smaller proportions of their national income in productive capital than faster growing market economies, 
especially in Southern Europe. This finding differs fundamentally from what we know about the 
retardation of the Soviet economy over the same period.  
 
II 
Socialist national accounts must be treated with suspicion. Data on physical units of production are 
considered comparatively trustworthy. Eastern European scholars often used such measures as proxy 
for economic growth and the standard of living.22 By contrast, national income statistics were distorted 
by unrealistic producer prices, incorrect weighting of sectoral output, and inappropriate index-number 
methods.23 Independent western research has established alternative estimates based on the System of 
                                                 
17
 Balassa and Bertrand, ‘Growth performance’; Bergson, ‘Comparative productivity’; Easterly and Fischer, 
‘Soviet economic decline’; Ofer, ‘Soviet economic growth’; Ritschl, ‘Exercise’; Sleifer, Planning ahead; Van 
Ark, ‘Convergence’ 
18
 Brada, ‘Technological progress’, pp. 437-43. 
19
 On the East German economy, see Ritschl, ‘Exercise’, table 16.1, p. 500. On Czechoslovak and Polish 
industry, see Rusek,  ‘Industrial growth’, and Kemme, ‘Productivity’ respectively.  
20
 Heston et al., Penn World Tables 
21
 Feenstra et al., ‘The next generation’ 
22
 Bródy, ‘Measuring GDP’; Ehrlich, ‘Contest’ 
23
 On the methodology of socialist national accounts, see Horvat, ‘Conceptual background’ and Kaser, ‘Survey’.  
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National Accounts. They used official data only on physical output to construct time series that they 
linked to independently established benchmarks, which aggregated output by sector using factor-cost 
weights.24 The Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe carried out the most 
substantial work. It reported GNP for several countries including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, 
which have been widely used in empirical research and remain the main source of the Maddison data 
for the period 1950-1989.25 The same working papers provide evidence on GNP by sector of origin of 
product.26 
We obtain employment data from official publications.27 In the absence of comprehensive 
government statistics on labour hours outside industry, we follow a shortcut method to adjust total 
employment for changes in average work hours. If we assume that the number of extra hours that 
employees were required to work did not change dramatically over time, then, for the economy as a 
whole, the official workweek is a good indication of actual work hours. We have exact figures on total 
hours worked in Hungary after 1980, which confirm the accuracy of our approach.28 Legislation on the 
official workweek and its implementation are well documented. In addition, for Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, we assume that in 1989 at least five per cent of contract hours were lost due to the extensive 
strikes. To adjust labour input for returns to education, we use the most recent Barro-Lee data on average 
years of schooling for the adult working-age population.29  
For investment and capital stock, we generate new data that we consider more reliable than 
official statistics or scholarly estimates built on them. Socialist investment data suffered from numerous 
distortions. Under fixed prices and allocations, capital-goods suppliers could increase value added by 
degrading quality, either by changing product specifications or by shifting to less valuable inputs. Prices 
for new machines were inflated by unsubstantiated claims of major product innovation. Concealed 
inflation in the investment statistics was discussed in the Soviet context.30 But, gross capital formation 
was also magnified by additional items, such as the training of personnel, R&D, and inventories, which 
were fabricated in order for the main components of national accounts to match. Government accounts 
were often internally inconsistent, for instance when the sum of construction and machinery investment 
did not even approximate the value of gross fixed capital formation in the national accounts. Past 
investment data were frequently revised, especially for the 1950s and for Poland, in order for the current 
                                                 
24
 On the construction of the benchmarks, see Alton et al., Statistics, and Alton et al., The structure. 
25
 See Maddison, World economy, pp. 469-71. 
26
 Alton, ‘Economic structure’; Alton et al., Chechoslovakia; Alton et al., Economic growth; Alton et al., East 
European GNP; Czriják, Hungarian GNP; Holesovsky, Czechoslovakia; Lazarcik, Czechoslovak.  
27
 Employment statistics are generally considered uncontroversial. See Adam, ‘Employment policies’.  
28
 See The Conference Board Total Economy Database 
(http://www.conferenceboard.org/data/economydatabase/). 
29
 See Barro and Lee, ‘New dataset’, and data available at http://barrolee.com/. 
30
 Nove, ‘Note on growth’; Wiles, ‘Soviet consumption’; Bergson, ‘Soviet real investment’; Kontorovich, 
‘Inflation’ 
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rate of capital formation to appear higher relative to earlier periods. The sources of these inconsistencies 
are difficult, often impossible, to identify.  
Investment statistics appeared consistent at the time with capital stock levels because government 
figures overstated capital depreciation, not only gross investment. For Hungary, the statistical 
yearbooks reported total depreciation by asset type from 1985 onward. These values imply depreciation 
rates of approximately 10 per cent for equipment, which are much higher than what researchers applied 
pre-1960 and almost as high as what they assumed for the period 1960-2000 for Spain.31 Given that 
socialist economies extended the service lives of both machinery and transport equipment, these 
depreciation rates are implausible. State enterprises seem to have made excessive use of their allowance 
to write off depreciated assets, which may have helped them overstate their needs for capital 
replacement and thus their claim for investment funds.   
We determine capital stock with the perpetual-inventory method developed by economists and 
social accountants to build up stocks of capital from flows of investment.32 
ܭଵ = ෍(1 െ ߜ)௡௧ୀ଴ ܫ௧                                                                     [1] 
Following this approach, the stock of fixed capital in a given year evolves according to the value 
of new investments made in that year and the depreciation of the existing stock. ܭ௧ = (1 െ ߜ)ܭ௧ିଵ +  ܫ௧                                                                   [2] 
The capital stock (K) in year t is derived from the stock of the year t-1 by adding investment (I), 
more precisely gross fixed capital formation, and subtracting capital depreciation. The same method 
can be applied to estimate past capital stock from more recent levels with retrospective calculation.33 
The exact formula in equation (2) measures the capital stock at the end of year t.  ߜ = ܴ ܶΤ                                                                               [3] 
The depreciation rate į is asset-specific and inversely related to the service life of the asset, with 
parameter R (declining balance) and T, the average service life typical for the type of asset. If R equals 
one, then depreciation is arithmetic. This pattern is typical for buildings and structures. Geometric 
depreciation, when R equals two, is more suitable for estimating the stock of machinery and equipment. 
Empirical studies adopted the ‘modified’ geometric depreciation pattern proposed by Jorgenson that 
falls between the arithmetic and geometric patterns.34 We take the depreciation of structures to be 
                                                 
31
 See Prados de la Escosura and Roses, ‘Capital’, table 2, p. 146. 
32
 Jorgenson, ‘Economic theory’; Jorgenson, ‘Accounting for capital’; Hulten, ‘Measurement’ 
33
 Feinstein, National income was among the first to make such calculations. 
34
 See Jorgenson, ’Productivity’, pp. 42-5. Using data from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, 
Hulten and Wykoff, ‘Measurement’, p. 94, estimated econometrically R=1.65 for equipment and R=0.91 for 
structures. 
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arithmetic and assume R=1.5 for equipment, but we also run robustness checks with alternative 
depreciation patterns in Appendix III. 
Previous accounts of postwar growth have used a range of values for the service life. 50-70 years 
are typical for dwellings, 30-40 years for other structures.35 We use T=50 until the late 1960s and T=40 
thereafter. Soaring public investment from 1968 in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and from 1971 in 
Poland shifted resources to transport infrastructure and modern standardized housing using cheap 
materials that were assumed to have shorter lifespans than traditional buildings. Previous studies have 
used asset lives of 10-25 years for machinery, with road transport vehicles and communications 
equipment, and more modern vintages, in general, thought to have faster depreciation. Since command 
economies were known for capital goods being kept beyond the point where they were fully depreciated 
by wear-and-tear, we assume long service lives for machinery: T=25 in the early postwar decades T=20 
for the 1970s and 1980s. These assumptions imply depreciation rates of 2 per cent for structures and 6 
per cent for equipment until 1967 (1970 for Poland) and rates of 2.5 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively 
thereafter. The estimated rates of capital accumulation are not very sensitive to alternative values of T 
used in the literature that are plausible for the period and the countries we study. We report robustness 
checks in Appendix III. 
The perpetual inventory method requires data on the benchmark value of fixed assets and on 
levels of machinery and construction investment expressed in the prices of the benchmark year. The 
former cannot be independently established. We must cautiously select the most trustable official 
sources. For Czechoslovakia and Hungary, we use data from 1990, the first year after transition and the 
introduction of market prices for many capital goods, which can be directly linked with our new 
investment series. The reported values are plausible: they imply capital-output ratios close to 3, which 
is standard globally for this period.36 Poland experienced hyperinflation in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. The best pre-inflation benchmark is 1971, when the country, following other nations in Central 
Europe, introduced radical economic reforms that systematically revised official prices. The 
comprehensive re-evaluation of fixed assets in the socialist sector aimed at producer prices that better 
reflect factor costs, since enterprises were subsequently required to pay interest on their capital and 
could to write off depreciation.37 These are the most reliable statistics for capital stock during the 
socialist period and the relative prices of the reform year approximate most closely real factor costs.38  
                                                 
35
 See Prados de la Escosura and Roses, ‘Capital’, table 1, p. 145. 
36
 Feenstra et al., ‘The next generation’, online appendix, p. 16. 
37
 On the reforms in the three countries, see Staller, ‘Czechoslovakia’, Balassa, ‘The economic reform’, Kýn, 
‘Rise and fall’, Portes, ‘Economic reforms’, Hare and Wanless, ‘Polish and Hungarian’, and Kornai, ‘The 
Hungarian reforms’. 
38
 Official data for Czechoslovakia and Hungary report net capital stock for both machinery and structures in 
1990. Polish statistics for 1971 only report gross capital stock. We derive net values using the ratio of net to 
gross stock in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but we assume somewhat lower ratios, as the Polish capital stock in 
1970 had to be considerably older, after decades of very low investment. 
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Previous studies have used alternative methods to estimate initial capital stock, especially when 
official data is not available, or cannot be relied on to construct plausible benchmarks. The production-
function approach, originally proposed by Harberger, determines the initial stock by the steady-state 
relationship between the initial level of investment, the growth of investment, and the rate of 
depreciation.39 It has been used in empirical research on developing countries and on long-run growth.40 
However, it has the caveats that European economies were far off their steady state after the war and 
that it is difficult to establish the steady-state growth rate of investment. The recent PWT updates 
determine initial stock by assuming plausible capital-output ratios. This approach also becomes 
problematic in the postwar context, when factor proportions were temporarily dislocated from their 
norm. 
Recent advances in estimating capital input used the concept of capitals services, which has been 
applied in historical research.41 This approach provides a more direct measure of capital inputs in 
production and the imputed ratio of capital input to stock can be used as an indicator of capital quality 
in the growth accounting formulae. However, it requires data on the rental price of capital. It is, 
therefore, inappropriate for centrally planned economies, where capital goods were directly allocated, 
and thus there were no market interest rates. The only solution to circumvent this problem would be to 
use values estimated for market economies, but this would imply critical assumptions about technology 
use. In addition, computing capital input would likely not yield rates of capital accumulation radically 
different from our estimates. Prados de la Escosura and Roses found very similar rates of net capital 
formation for Spain using a battery of alternative computations, even in the postwar era of high 
growth.42 
We follow two strategies to construct new investment series. For the period 1950-1967, the 
Research Project published independent estimates for investment in both equipment and structures that 
reflect the volume of investment goods and construction services.43 They measure construction 
investment by gross output in construction that, in turn, is approximated by the availability of building 
materials. Equipment investment is estimated by the production of machinery and other instruments, 
adjusted for net imports and disregarding year-to-year changes in inventories.  
These are upper-bound estimates of actual investment. Until the mid-1960s, reported levels of 
machinery investment can be deemed accurate, as the share of consumer durables in engineering output 
remained very small, and items seldom used as capital goods, such as bicycles, motorcycles and 
                                                 
39
 Harberger, ‘Perspectives’  
40
 Nehru and Dareshwar, ‘New database’; Young, ‘Tyranny of numbers’; Prados de la Escosura and Roses, 
‘Sources’; Idem, ‘Capital’ 
41
 Jorgenson, ‘Capital’, p. 10; Jorgenson, ‘Productivity’, pp. 46-8; Prados de la Escosura and Roses, ‘Sources’, 
p. 1068; Idem, ‘Capital’, pp. 146-8. 
42
 Prados de la Escosura and Roses, ‘Capital’, table 5, p. 155.  
43
 Bandor et al., Hungary; Czirják, Hungarian investment; Holesovsky, Czechoslovakia; Korbonski et al., 
Poland; Staller, Czechoslovak index of investment; Staller, Czechoslovak index of construction 
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communication equipment, were subtracted from machinery output.44 Military hardware may have 
carved out more substantial shares from engineering output, but we have no reliable data on the 
components of defence spending for the 1950s and early 1960s. Scholarly estimates using both detailed 
budgetary figures and proxy methods for the period after 1965 suggest that these shares never surpassed 
5 per cent after adjusting for arms trade, and were likely smaller because military hardware included 
equipment that could be put to productive use, such as transport vehicles.45 Approximating construction 
investment with the volume of available building materials can be considered plausible for the entire 
period, provided that the value-added share of construction services remained constant. The literature 
argued that waste in materials, if anything, increased over time, due both to the growing complexity of 
input requirements and the long duration of building projects.46 To the extent that these arguments hold, 
we go against our hypotheses by overstating the growth of investment and thus the rate of capital 
accumulation. 
For the period after 1967, the Research Project did not publish similar estimates, since they would 
have no longer measured the level and structure of investment accurately. Instead, it reported an index 
of domestic final use, decomposed into three major items: household consumption, government 
consumption, and a residual.47 The residual is largely gross capital formation but also includes sub-
components of public spending not included under government consumption, most notably national 
defence and R&D, and changes in inventories.  
For the period after 1965, we use the index of the Research Project on construction to account 
for investment in structures, but we derive the index of equipment investment by decomposing the 
residual term of domestic absorption.48 Specifically, we subtract for each year the index of military 
spending and of R&D reported elsewhere by the Research Project from the index of residual final use, 
weighting each sub-component by its share in total GDP in the benchmark years of the index-number 
series.49 To determine these weights, we take disaggregate data on research outlays from official sources 
and total military expenditure as a percentage of GDP from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI).50 In light of the controversy about Soviet budgetary figures on national defence, one 
could question the reliability of this evidence.51 However, previous research has shown data on military 
spending in Central Europe to be much more accurate. Estimates constructed using wages and living-
costs for personnel expenses and input-output and trade statistics to determine material costs came close 
                                                 
44
 Even in Austria, a more prosperous and consumer-oriented economy relative to socialist countries, very few 
private households owned modern appliances before the late 1960s. See Seidel, Österreichs Wirtschaft, table 
1.13, p. 57. 
45
 Crane, ‘Military spending’, pp. 530-8. 
46
 Banerjee and Spagat, ‘Productivity paralysis’ 
47
 Alton et al., Eastern Europe; Alton et al., East European GNP 
48
 We assume that aggregation errors were random and that the relative size of inventories did not change over 
time, since we cannot establish these items independently. 
49
 Alton et al., Economic growth; Alton et al., East European GNP 
50
 SIPRI, Yearbook, 1980, p. 29; 1991, pp. 174-5. 
51
 Epstein, ‘Economic costs’, p. 127; Davis, ‘Defence sector’, pp. 155-6; Harrison, ‘Secrets’, see abstract. 
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to budgetary figures.52 The lack of transparency in government accounts was found to be much more 
serious in the Soviet Union than in the smaller Warsaw Pact countries.53  
The index for equipment investment is obtained by subtracting the construction index from the 
index of fixed-capital investment. We assume that gross fixed capital formation evolved as gross capital 
formation, disregarding changes in inventories that we cannot establish independently. In order to 
minimize the impact of aggregation errors and of unobserved swings in inventories, we smooth the 
index-number series for residual final use before we decompose this index. We then link our post-1965 
index for equipment investment to the level estimates of the Research Project for the period 1950-1967. 
The thus obtained investment levels are converted into prices of the benchmark years for capital stock 
using official price indexes for investments by asset type.54 We discuss the methods the Research 
Project used to estimate the different components of domestic final use in Appendix I. 
 
III 
In this section, we compare our estimates for equipment and construction investment to official 
statistics. We then trace the share of gross capital formation in GDP and contrast these rates with the 
investment ratios of Southern European countries. This exercise demonstrates that slow capital 
accumulation was instrumental in the falling behind of Central Europe. We report investment and 
capital stock by year in Appendix II. Figure 1 and figure 2 plot investment in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary respectively. We compare these new estimates with official data on total investment, since 
government statistics on gross fixed capital formation did not always distinguish between asset types.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 
 
Following the rapid recovery after World War II and a temporary setback in the early 1950s, 
investment continued to grow steadily until about 1970. Thereafter, the two economies walked different 
paths. The share of equipment in total investment increased in Czechoslovakia until the mid-1970s. In 
Hungary, machinery investment declined from 1971 and in the 1980s fell back to levels achieved 
already two decades earlier. Construction investment began to diminish after 1978 but remained higher 
relative to earlier periods than equipment investment. In Czechoslovakia, construction stabilized after 
1978, while machinery investment plummeted in the early 1980s and recovered after 1985. Over the 
last twenty years of communism, capital accumulation focused more strongly on machinery in 
Czechoslovakia than in Hungary, even if during the 1980s the share of equipment investment fell 
considerably in both countries. This is not surprising given the structural differences between the two 
economies, which we discuss in the following section. The value-added share of the most mechanised 
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sectors, especially industry, was larger in Czechoslovakia and continued to increase moderately even 
during the 1970s and 1980s, when it was already declining in Hungary.  
In both countries, retrospective official accounts underestimated investment during the 1950s and 
the early 1960s, but the rates of investment growth do not differ much from our estimates. By contrast, 
official data massively overstate the growth of investment during the 1970s and, therefore, investment 
levels in the 1980s. In reality, investment at best stagnated and most likely declined from the mid-1970s 
onward. The fall of investment after 1980 affected predominantly machinery investment. Even in 
Czechoslovakia, investment growth in the 1970s and 1980s was much less remarkable than officially 
claimed and resulted mainly from increasing outlays for building projects. 
Poland represents a different case (see figure 3). Investment levels were very low after the war, 
and the stock of fixed capital declined until 1950, of machinery until 1952. Investment growth resumed 
thereafter, but remained modest until the mid-1960s, contrary to the official statistics. Slow capital 
accumulation in this period reflected the unique factor proportions that the Polish economy inherited 
from the 1940s. Destruction of physical capital was substantial, for sure, but western research found 
contemporary Polish estimates deliberately exaggerative as they were meant to serve as basis for 
reparations and foreign economic assistance.55 Furthermore, most of the damage affected residential 
and transport infrastructure, not production equipment.56 In fact, production capacity was enhanced 
significantly in the primary industries. Between 1938 and 1943, steel production in Upper Silesia had 
almost tripled.57 By contrast, Poland suffered colossal wartime casualties and even greater loss of 
manpower due to the exodus and expulsion of ethnic Germans from the eastern provinces of Prussia 
after the war. The total population declined by one fifth between 1939 and 1947. It was not before 1963 
that Poland recovered from this demographic shock.58 However, the impact of the war was even larger 
on the industrial labour force and especially skilled labour. 79 per cent of all victims were urban 
dwellers, the number of industrial workers declined by more than 20 per cent, among self-employed by 
more than 40 per cent, and employment in commerce was down 60 per cent. Both the Holocaust and 
the extensive purge of the Polish economic elites by the German occupiers decimated management 
personnel in engineering, trade, and finance even more.59 Thus, the Polish economy was short of labour 
during the 1950s and, therefore, could grow into existing production capacities. After 1970, investment 
growth became explosive, both in construction and equipment, but only temporarily, and investment 
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Throughout the 1960s and until the mid-1970s, investment in machinery was catching up with 
levels of construction investment. From 1978, investments declined but fell much more dramatically 
for equipment. The final collapse of investment activity after 1985 was entirely the product of sluggish 
machinery investment. Official figures report considerably faster investment growth already after 1960, 
but the overstatement of growth rates in the 1970s was spectacular. It was suggested that investment 
doubled between 1972 and 1975. This and the apparent recovery after 1985 are serious distortions 
produced by official statistics, the source of which is difficult to identify. 
Two core results stand out for all three economies. Firstly, investment levels during the 1980s 
were much lower than what official data had suggested and what researchers using these data believed. 
Secondly, capital formation slowed down in the last decade of communism mainly because of the sharp 
decline in machinery investment. Still, investment levels alone do not tell much about growth dynamics. 
Rates of capital accumulation and of economic growth depend more on relative levels of investment, 
the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP. The PWT are the most commonly used source for 
investment ratios in cross-country investigations. Vonyó published a new set of investment rates across 
Eastern Europe between 1950 and 1989, which reflect continuously increasing ratios until the 1970s 
and sharply falling rates in the 1980s, except for the Soviet Union. Socialist economies invested 
considerably smaller proportions of their national income than faster growing nations in Western 
Europe, except in the 1970s.60 However, these investment ratios are upper-bound benchmark estimates 
that may reflect biased relative prices for investment goods and that included, in some cases, minor 




We take a different approach. We derive benchmark investment rates from the last version of the 
PWT that reported data on all the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. PWT 5.6 reported 
investment rates both as real GDP components and in current international prices. For the benchmark 
year 1985, both shares were taken directly from official national accounts. We correct these benchmark 
rates for the proportional difference between our investment levels and official figures, assuming that 
this ratio for gross fixed capital formation also holds for gross capital formation. The investment ratios 
for all other years are then interpolated using our constant-price investment series and Maddison data 
on GDP.61 We again assume that gross capital formation evolved over time as gross fixed capital 
formation. Figure 4 reports striking results. Relative levels of investment in Central Europe were rather 
modest, and fell dramatically during the 1980s. In both Czechoslovakia and Hungary, investment ratios 
surged during the collectivization drives of the early and late 1950s. In the late 1960s and the early 
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1970s, Hungary and Poland borrowed heavily from international creditors and used money from abroad 
to scale up investment. Other times, Polish investment rates were well below 20 per cent, and were very 




Figure 5 compares investment ratios for the three Central European countries weighted by their 
real GDP with the weighted average rates calculated from the most recent PWT data for Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. PWT 9.0 reports investment shares in current international PPPs using multiple 
benchmarks for GDP spending components. For OECD countries, these include 1975, 1980, 1985 and 
1995 onward. Price indices are interpolated for all years between these benchmarks and extrapolated 
from 1975 for all previous years.62 Italy being the most advanced economy of the region and the only 
country with a democratic political system since the start of the period, we chart two alternative sets of 
investment ratios- with and without Italy respectively. Except for the 1970s, Central Europe lagged 
behind the market economies of Southern Europe not just in rates of economic growth but also in rates 
of investment. The bar charts measured on the secondary vertical axis show that the largest growth 
differentials in real GDP per capita averaged over five-year periods between 1950 and 1990 typically 
correspond with the most substantial gaps in the investment ratios. This finding concurs with recent 
research in that the falling behind of socialist economies can, to a large extent, be explained within a 
standard conditional convergence framework.63 We reveal this to be true even for the 1980s, when the 
growth failure of Central Europe versus strong growth in Southern Europe coincided with a striking 
divergence in investment activity between the two regions. 
 
IV 
Table 1 reports average growth rates of national income and factor inputs according to alternative 
sources and specifications. Previous research benefited from downward-revised estimates for the 
growth of national income. Official sources reported rapid growth until the late 1970s, followed by a 
sudden and sharp slowdown. In fact, socialist economies ran out of steam more gradually from the late 
1960s onward. They were falling behind successful modernizers in both Southern Europe and East Asia 
throughout the postwar period, not only after 1980. The extent to which government statistics overstated 
economic growth was drastically reduced during the 1980s. We observe the opposite pattern in the 
capital-stock data. Our estimates show that official accounts overstated the rate of capital accumulation 
only in the second half of the period, and the margin of error increased over time. This finding already 
suggests that previous research on the relative decline of socialist economies may have been seriously 
mislead by faulty statistics. 
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Table 1  
 
Polish official data were inaccurate even in comparison with the accounts of other socialist 
governments. The rate of capital accumulation was overstated even more than economic growth. Price 
distortions are the most likely culprit in the margin of error for the 1980s, when inflation spiralled out 
of control. Polish statistics on capital stock do not allow us to construct growth rates for the 1950s, 
meaning that our new estimates not only improve on the existing evidence but also extend it. The 
common feature in our figures for all three countries is that capital accumulation accelerated until the 
early 1970s, but the economic slowdown after 1980 coincided with sharply reduced rates of net capital 
formation. 
This is not the end of the story! Employment figures alone do not measure the growth of labour 
input accurately. In the 1970s and 1980s, which saw most of the reductions in weekly work hours, the 
total number of hours grew much slower than employment. In Czechoslovakia, the official workweek 
was already shortened in the late 1950s and again a decade later. In addition, by the end of the 1980s, 
extensive strikes reduced actual labour input considerably in both Czechoslovakia and Poland. We made 
a conservative assumption that this effect cost only 5 per cent of contract hours in both countries in 
1989. The adjusted growth rates show only modest labour expansion in Czechoslovakia between 1950 
and 1970 and practically zero after 1980. In both Hungary and Poland, labour input declined sharply 
during the 1980s. This contraction did not only result from falling average work hours; total 
employment fell, too.    
We apply the standard growth accounting framework developed by Solow, which applies a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
equal to one between capital and labour.64  
௧ܻ = ܣ௧(ܭ௧)ఈ(ܮ௧)ଵିఈ                                                                      [4] 
Value added Y in period t is the function of the capital stock (K), labour input (L), and Total 
Factor Productivity (A). The coefficients Įand 1-Į denote the elasticity of output with respect to capital 
and labour. Output growth can arise from the expansion of factor inputs or from TFP growth. ο݈ܻ݊ = ߙο݈݊ܭ + (1 െ ߙ)ο݈݊ܮ + ο݈݊ܣ                                                      [5] 
Equation (5) can be rewritten to express TFP growth as the proportion of labour-productivity 
growth unexplained by capital deepening, the increase of the capital-labour ratio. This formula is more 
appropriate to assessing the nature of growth under central planning. ο݈݊ܣ = ο݈݊(ܻ ܮΤ ) െ ߙ[ο݈݊(ܭ ܮΤ )]                                                         [6] 
                                                 
64
 Solow, ’Technical change’, p. 312. 
 15 
Growth accounts commonly use the value of 1/3 for Į, which is a reasonable approximation of 
the share of capital in national income in advance market economies. However, it has been argued that 
a higher capital share is more realistic for command economies.65 Following this literature, we assume 
constant Į of 0.4. In theory, if production factors are paid their marginal products, factor elasticities can 
be computed from data on factors. Since these factor shares are difficult to determine for centrally 
planned economies, we report robustness checks using both upper-bound and lower-bound plausible 
values of Įin Appendix III. 
The growth accounting framework was developed for market, not centrally planned, economies. 
Nevertheless, we consider it a useful analytical tool even for the latter, where central planner rather than 
the market determined prices and factor costs.  Weitzman proposed that socialist economies were better 
represented by a production function with CES below one.66 Easterly and Fischer argued the same for 
the Soviet Union, and Rusek for Czechoslovakia.67 But, we agree with Allen’s rebuttal, supported by 
Crafts, that the technological possibilities available to planned and market economies did not differ 
profoundly enough to validate the assumption of radically different underlying production functions.68 
To the extent that Weitzman was correct, our approach would underestimate TFP growth, especially in 
the 1980s. Since unit CES does not fully capture diminishing returns to capital, it may overstate the 
contribution of higher capital-labour ratios to labour-productivity growth. Our estimates for TFP growth 
are, therefore, lower bound. 
We adjust labour input for returns to education, even though true returns are difficult to determine 
for centrally planned economies. Denison developed the first extended Solow model with education as 
a labour-augmenting factor, but we use the specification proposed by Hall and Jones.69 
௧ܻ = ܣ௧(ܭ௧)ఈ(ܪ௧)ଵିఈ                                                                      [7] 
Human capital-augmented labour (H) is defined as the product of labour input and the efficiency 
of labour with E years of schooling relative to the efficiency with no schooling. The derivative ׋’(E) is 
the actual return to education and is estimated with Mincerian wage regressions.  ܪ௧ = ݁థ(ா೟)ܮ௧                                                                               [8] 
Hall and Jones take the rate of return to be piecewise linear, 13.4 per cent for each of the first 
four years of education, 10.1 per cent for each of the next four years, and 6.8 per cent per year after the 
eighth year of schooling.70 Previous research using the wage grid of socialist economies computed 
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substantially lower returns to education, but we consider these estimates biased by the strong wage 
compression that socialist governments enforced.71 These low rates reflect not so much the poor 
efficiency derived from education, but the modest monetary rewards offered for these efficiency gains. 
To the extent that the true returns to education were smaller than the global average rates, our refined 
estimates of TFP growth can also be considered lower bound. Letting h denote human capital per worker 
(H/L), TFP growth is computed as the residual of labour-productivity growth after subtracting the 
contributions of capital deepening and education. ο݈݊ܣ = ο݈݊(ܻ ܮΤ ) െ ߙ[ο݈݊(ܭ ܮΤ )] െ  (1 െ ߙ)ο݈݄݊                                          [9] 
Our revised growth accounts in Table 2 paint a different picture from past research that 
underestimated labour-productivity growth from the 1960s, and overestimated the increase in the 
capital-labour ratio. The growth of labour productivity and TFP slowed down throughout the postwar 
era, but we obtain higher rates of TFP growth than what the previously available data implied. The 
upward revision of productivity growth is most notable after 1970, especially for the 1980s. Hungary 
and Poland both recorded respectable rates of labour productivity growth until the end of communism, 
and while TFP growth slowed down after the golden age, it did not decline further between the 1970s 
and the 1980s. Czechoslovakia posted comparatively modest rates of productivity growth from the 
1960s, but TFP growth remained positive and it slowed down gradually. These results do not refute 
previous findings that socialist countries performed poorly relative to western market economies, but 
they have important implications for our understanding of their growth failure during the 1980s and of 




Poland represents a unique case. In contradiction with the standard view of socialist development, 
Polish growth in the early postwar period was driven entirely by labour expansion, not capital 
accumulation. The capital-labour ratio was markedly reduced during the 1950s, and then it stagnated until 
the late 1960s. This is prima facie evidence for increasing capacity utilization and for the existence of a 
vast capital surplus in the early days of communism. The most pressing challenge for Polish governments 
was not how to rebuild destroyed capital, but how to make use of existing capacities given the evident 
shortage of skilled labour, already recognised as the main bottleneck of reconstruction by the famous 
postwar economist Oskar Lange.72 Consequently, there was little need for additional investment, which 
explains why the capital stock grew so slowly before 1970. With less investment in new equipment, 
labour-productivity grew was modestly than in other socialist countries. By contrast, soaring investment 
in the early 1970s and the sharp contraction of labour input during the 1980s made labour-productivity 
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growth more and more investment driven. Still, TFP growth remained positive, and slowed down 
gradually from the 1960s, not abruptly after 1980. 
Surplus capacities also have a role in explaining high TFP growth in Czechoslovakia during the 
1950s. Due to the expulsion of ethnic Germans from the Sudetenland, the population decline after 1945 
combined with robust capital accumulation during the war left Czech industry with surplus capital. 
Subsequent investment was used to adopt more capital-intensive production technology (which had its 
beginnings in the interwar years) and to substitute capital for scarce labour in agriculture, which lost a 
quarter of its workforce in the late 1950s. 73 The reallocation of farm workers into industry, in turn, 
reduced surplus capacity in manufacturing. The failure of the Polish economy to replicate this process 
was most likely the consequence of an initially weaker industrial base, especially in capacities to 
produce steel-based capital goods, and the failed attempts at collectivizing the farming sector. Input-
output bottlenecks in the machinery sector arising from border effects and the differential impact of 
wartime destruction across industries, due to their different spatial concentration, may also be partly to 
blame.  
Our main quantitative findings hold, at large, when we adjust for returns to schooling. 
Improvements in education and vocational training are among the least doubted achievements of 
socialism. Even when at the expense of teaching quality, educational standards increased, especially in 
primary schooling and technical education. However, since the growth of educational attainment was 
rather smooth over the socialist period, accounting for labour quality does not alter the trajectory of 
productivity growth – except for Poland in the 1960s and Hungary between the 1970s and the 1980s. 
As Poland recovered from the demographic shock it had suffered in the 1940s, the best educated young 
cohorts born after 1945 and newly entering the labour force made up a large share of the working age 
population in the late 1960s. Labour qualifications improved little in Hungary after 1980, when the 
youngest working-age cohorts carried less weight in average attainment levels than the oldest workers, 




Figure 6 summarizes our main findings. As in many other regions of postwar Europe, the gradual 
slowdown of economic growth reflected declining rates of productivity growth.75 However, the socialist 
growth failure after 1980 was mainly input driven. This conclusion becomes even stronger, when we 
recognize that structural change thwarted aggregate productivity growth in the 1980s. Given the 
emphasis that the literature placed on labour reallocation between agriculture and industry, our revision 
of the socialist growth record cannot be complete without some discussion of structural development.  
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Data limitations prevent us from being able to estimate structural components of labour-
productivity growth or of TFP growth. We do not have reliable evidence on capital input at the sector 
or industry level. In addition, the industry classification used in the official employment statistics is not 
consistent across the three countries and differs from the industry coverage of our sources for sectoral 
GDP data, especially in services. Finally, we do not have any way of estimating hours worked outside 
of mining and manufacturing. Therefore, any disaggregate measure of labour productivity or TFP that 
we could construct would not only be inaccurate and hard to compare across countries; they would be 
methodologically inconsistent with our productivity estimates for the economy as a whole. Nonetheless, 




Table 3 reports the share of six major sectors of the economy in GDP in constant prices. The 
share of industry ceased to increase by the late 1970s, but deindustrialization after the oil shocks was 
not as dramatic as in western market economies. Structural modernization lost momentum after the 
1960s. In Hungary, the relative decline of agriculture came to a halt already in the 1970s, and after 1980 
the share of the farming sector in total value added increased in all three countries. The view that central 
planning was not flexible enough to support a successful transition from an industrial to a more service-
based economy needs qualification. Modern services, including trade, transport, and communications, 
made a great leap forward during the 1970s but contracted more than any other sector after 1980, most 
drastically in Poland. By contrast, the relative decline of non-material services, including the 
government, was reversed after 1980. As the following section will explain, this reversal of structural 
change in socialist economies was a response to exogenous shocks. Despite the industrialisation drive 
of the 1950s and 1960s and the expansion of services since the 1970s, the overall pattern emerging from 
Table 3 is remarkably little structural change over the forty-year period. This is largely the reflection of 
the fact that previous research accounted for sectoral shares in the labour force, not in GDP. The relative 
size of farm employment fell sharply until the 1970s, but to a large extent this was offset by much faster 
factor substitution within agriculture than in industry. 
 
V 
If the growth failure that eventually undermined communism in Central Europe was input driven, then 
what caused the sharp fall in investment and the diminishing rate of capital accumulation? Answers 
need not be invented. We can draw from the literature on developing regions and from contemporary 
observers in the three countries we study. Parallels with Latin America are particularly striking, where 
the ‘lost decade’ of growth has been linked to poor investment in physical and human capital, which in 
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turn was explained by the debt overhang and the payments crises of the 1980s.76 These factors were 
overlooked in studies that sought to interpret the failure of planned economies as the consequence of 
technological and allocation inefficiencies above all else.77 
Two exogenous shocks negatively affected Eastern Europe at the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Firstly, the oil shocks were more detrimental than elsewhere. Until 1975, COMECON countries 
imported crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum products from the Soviet Union at prices fixed typically 
well below the world market price. This practice prompted scholars to argue that the USSR subsidized 
the economic development of its satellites.78 After the first oil shock had radically improved the Soviet 
terms of trade with western markets and Soviet industry was in grave need to import western machinery, 
the fixed-price regime was abandoned and COMECON prices were determined as five-year moving 
averages of the world market price. The ensuing increase of import bills in Central and Southeast Europe 
was initially smoother and somewhat delayed, but lasted longer than elsewhere, until the mid-1980s.79  
Rising fuel prices made socialist industries less competitive because they applied fuel-intensive 
technologies. This was not the outcome of technical backwardness but of rational choice. Due to the 
vast fossil-fuel deposits of the COMECON, energy prices were both nominally and relatively lower 
than in the West until the late 1970s. It thus paid to employ fuel-inefficient technologies. This argument 
is supported by existing research on input use in manufacturing. Data derived from the material balances 
of socialist economies and input-output matrices constructed for OECD countries indicate that input-
output ratios differed as much or more within these two groups of economies as between them, 
especially in manufacturing.80 It was because of their consistently higher energy intensity that the input-
output ratios of socialist economies on average appeared higher and that these ratios increased over time 
relative to market economies.81 After the oil shocks, this implied for socialist countries outside the 
Soviet Union loss of competitiveness, worsening terms of trade, and the need for massive investments 
to replace the existing stock of fuel-inefficient equipment. 
Secondly, public debt in Eastern Europe soared during the 1970s, thanks to cheap international 
credit and urged by popular demands for improved social infrastructure. After 1980, refinancing their 
external debt became more costly for socialist countries as western creditors raised interest rates in an 
attempt to combat inflation at home. In the context of the Cold War, autarky was the logical, albeit self-
destructive, policy response. Both the Soviet politburo and the COMECON council called upon socialist 
countries to limit their imports and to drastically cut back on international borrowing.82 This had 
damaging consequences for economic growth and productivity. In aggregate terms, even though GDP 
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continued to increase, domestic absorption effectively stagnated. As governments struggled to satisfy 
demands to expand public services, increase the availability of consumer goods, and improve housing, 
investment in machinery became the prime victim of austerity.83 Our estimates have shown that the 
shrinking share of national income available for investment was shifted from equipment towards 
construction. Paradoxically, as communist regimes were nearing their collapse, they disbursed record 
sums for building projects. Social housing programs are partly to blame, but equally hurting was the 
construction of nuclear power plants in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, precisely with the aim of reducing 
the dependence of both countries on imported hydrocarbons.  
These external shocks and the policy response they invoked limited both the expansion and 
modernization of production capacities. The need to improve their balance of trade forced socialist 
countries to promote exports at all cost. To achieve this, they diverted investment to low-productivity 
sectors with relatively strong export potential in hard-currency markets, especially food products. 
Deflationary policies (most notably in Czechoslovakia) seeking to dampen the impact of rising energy 
prices and to improve trade balances also hampered investment and productivity.84 The need to curtail 
imports from hard-currency areas may have also contributed to slower productivity growth by making 
it harder to implement advanced western technologies.85  
Low levels of equipment investment and hard-currency constraints on the import of western 
technology implied slow growth in productive capacity and sluggish technological progress as well as 
employment creation. Therefore, austerity affected both input growth and productivity negatively. 
Previous research on the importance of machinery investment for productivity supports this argument.86 
It also corresponds with recent evidence pointing to the conditionality of technological gains on 
sufficiently high capital-labour ratios, and thus investment.87 Labour input declined further because of 
the shortening of the official workweek and popular welfare measures, including very generous 
maternity benefits and a low retirement age for women that diminished female labour participation after 
it had increased robustly for decades.88  
Although the 1980s demonstrated these common features in most socialist countries, the severity 
of the crisis varied because the strength of the external shocks was not uniform either. In Poland, GDP 
per capita fell between 1980 and 1989. After reckless borrowing in the 1970s, the Polish government 
was the first to declare insolvency in the wake of the second oil shock, before the avalanche of Latin 
American defaults began. Extreme austerity and the return to violent political repression under General 
Jaruzelski spurred popular dissent. The Solidarity strikes reduced manufacturing output, which further 
                                                 
83
 Alton et al., Eastern Europe; Bálek, ‘Czechoslovak economy’ 
84
 Brada, ‘Technological progress’, p. 439. 
85
 Whitesell, ‘Influence’, p. 241. 
86
 De Long, ‘Productivity growth’; De Long and Summers, ‘Equipment investment’ 
87
 Kumar and Russel, ‘Technological change’; Allen, ‘Technology and the Great Divergence’ 
88
 See Adam, ‘Employment policies’.  
 21 
curbed resources for investment.89 Czechoslovakia, by contrast, recorded the highest growth rates in 
Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union.90 Because of limited borrowing in the 1970s, Czechoslovakia 
did not need to tighten the belts as much as other countries and, therefore, could maintain higher levels 
of investment. Machinery investment declined less drastically than in Hungary and Poland. Hungary 
represents a special case within the Soviet bloc. It managed to ease the pressure of austerity by 
maintaining access to western credit after it joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1982.   
 
VI 
Why did socialist economies fail? The falling behind of Eastern Europe in income per capita and 
productivity during the Cold War has been blamed on the intrinsic inefficiencies of central planning. 
This view is widely accepted in both the theoretical and the empirical literature. In most of the existing 
growth accounts for Eastern Europe, the inefficiencies of socialism were manifested in the productivity 
failure that brought economic growth to a standstill by the 1980s and undermined the viability of 
communism. Planned economies, it has been argued, failed because they were bound to. By 
construction, they were incapable of a successful transition from an extensive growth model to one 
driven by innovation and rising productivity. 
While we accept that socialism was relatively inefficient, we argue that the socialist growth 
experience requires revision. Official statistics not only overstated the growth of national income but 
also the rate of capital accumulation. Planned economic development was not as capital intensive as 
previous research has suggested. Productivity growth never came to a standstill and certainly did not 
turn into reverse. The growth retardation of the 1980s in East Central Europe did not result from the 
failure to sustain productivity growth but mainly from the failure to sustain factor accumulation. As in 
many other late-developing regions, this was the outcome of powerful exogenous shocks. Unlike in the 
Soviet Union, the oil shocks and the debt crises that emerged in their aftermath invoked austerity, and 
investment in new machinery became the victim thereof. This caused growing technological 
backwardness, structural sclerosis, and even employment contraction. By reducing investment in new 
equipment, austerity also contributed to the lack of innovation after the era of mass production, and thus 
the widening technological gap with advanced market economies that the literature has emphasised. 
The policy response to the crisis undermined the legitimacy of the socialist system and brought it to 
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Appendix I: Data sources used in the reconstruction of gross fixed investment 
We used a combination of index-number series for construction and equipment investment to estimate 
levels of investment in fixed capital. Construction investment comes from the occasional papers of the 
Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe (hereafter Research Project).91 The same 
sources report estimates for equipment investment up to 1965.92 For the period 1965-1990, we derive 
indexes of equipment investment by decomposing data on the domestic final use of gross product.93 
Here, we explain in detail how each subcomponent had been estimated in the sources that we used.  
Construction investment is defined as the gross output of the construction industry, which for the 
economy as a whole is assumed to equal the total value of investments in new buildings and repairs on 
existing structures. Construction output, in turn, evolves according to the availability of construction 
materials. The sources make two critical assumptions, namely that both the value-added ratio and the 
share of material waste in the building trades remained constant over time. The weights of construction 
investment in GDP in the benchmarks are established as the sum of industry value-added and of material 
purchases from other sectors using official prices.   
Equipment investment up to 1965 is calculated by constructing an index of machinery available for 
domestic investment purposes. The Research Project built this index from disaggregated data on 
industrial production that it had complied and later published in other papers. Items believed to be used 
as consumer durables, such as bicycles, motorcycles, and all communications equipment, were excluded 
from the product sample. The index of machinery output was constructed from five aggregate 
production indexes for machine tools, agricultural machinery, prime movers and other equipment, 
transport vehicles, and electrical instruments incl. power generating equipment. To arrive at domestic 
availability, output was adjusted for net imports from official foreign-trade statistics. Values in foreign-
exchange currencies were converted into domestic producer prices using a basket of goods that were 
included in the production indexes and were listed in both domestic and international prices in official 
sources. Adjustments were made for net foreign investment, whenever possible, but the ratio of these 
transfers to total investments was found to be small. Official data indicated inventories to be highly 
volatile, and thus changes in inventories were assumed to be random. 
Fixed-capital investment up to 1965 was computed by the Research Project from the index of 
construction and equipment investment, weighted by using current prices for machinery items from 
official sources. From 1965, we derived investment from total domestic absorption. The Research 
Project reported indexes of three final-use components: personal household consumption; government 
services; and a residual composed of gross investment, R&D expenditure, and defence spending. We 
constructed a provisional index of gross investment by subtracting from residual final use the indexes 
on defence and R&D spending. We assume inventories to be random and, therefore, that gross fixed 
investment evolved according to gross investment. We finally subtract from this provisional index the 
construction index to arrive at investment in machinery. 
Indexes of final-use subcomponents: The index of personal consumption was constructed by 
aggregating indexes for several categories of consumer goods and services using official data 
from representative consumer surveys. Indexes of public consumption, disaggregated into 
                                                 
91
 Alton et al., Economic; Alton et al., East European GNP; Czirják, Hungarian GNP; Holesovsky, 
Czechoslovakia; Korbonski et al., Poland; Staller, Czechoslovak index of construction. 
92
 Czirják, Hungarian GNP; Holesovsky, Czechoslovakia; Korbonski et al., Poland; Staller, Czechoslovak index 
of investment. 
93
 Alton et al. Economic growth; Alton et al., East European GNP 
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administration and justice, health care, education, and social services, were the same as indexes 
for government services in the computation of GNP by sector of origin of product. These 
indexes, in turn, were derived from employment data, weighted using both wage returns and the 
value of materials and services purchased from other sectors of the economy. 
Index of R&D expenditure: The occasional papers on GNP by sector of origin also report 
indexes for science and research, using the same approach as for other government services. 
We establish the weight of total R&D spending in GDP from official data in the benchmark 
years that the Research Project used in the construction of indexes on final use.  
Index of military spending: The Research Project collected data on defence expenditures in East 
Central Europe.94 Based on this work, they established an index of military services in the 
occasional papers on GNP by sector of origin. As opposed to other government services, this 
index was based both on personnel and purchases of goods and services. Spending levels are 
similar to what we could derive from Crane up to 1984.95 We adhered to the Research Project 
data for three reasons: (i) consistency with the sources on other indexes, (ii) the lack of an 
appropriate prices index to deflate the constant-price estimates of Crane, and (iii) that these data 
suggest the largest drop (in Poland the slowest rise) in military spending over time, which makes 
us, if anything, overestimate investment growth and within that the share of equipment 
investment. We take the weight of defence expenditure in GDP from cross-country data 
published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).96 
  
                                                 
94
 Alton et al., ‘East European defense expenditures’  
95
 Crane, ‘Military spending’, pp. 530-2. 
96
 SIPRI, Yearbook, 1980, p. 29; 1991, pp. 174-5. 
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Appendix II: New estimates for investment and capital stock 
 
Table II.1. Gross fixed investment and gross capital stock in Czechoslovakia (billion 1990 crowns) 
 
Investment Capital Stock 
 
Equipment Structures Equipment Structures Total Index 
1948  9.5   26.5   168.8   575.6   744.5   96.0  
1949  8.6   26.0   167.3   590.1   757.4   97.6  
1950  10.8   29.3   168.1   607.6   775.7   100.0  
1951  11.8   30.3   169.8   625.7   795.5   102.6  
1952  10.2   33.9   169.8   647.1   816.9   105.3  
1953  9.9   35.2   169.5   669.4   838.8   108.1  
1954  10.1   36.5   169.4   692.4   861.8   111.1  
1955  11.9   41.3   171.1   719.9   891.0   114.9  
1956  13.6   45.7   174.4   751.2   925.6   119.3  
1957  16.0   49.3   179.9   785.5   965.4   124.5  
1958  18.4   53.4   187.5   823.2   1,010.7   130.3  
1959  19.9   58.9   196.2   865.7   1,061.9   136.9  
1960  22.6   61.1   207.0   909.4   1,116.4   143.9  
1961  23.3   60.9   217.9   952.2   1,170.1   150.9  
1962  23.4   60.7   228.2   993.8   1,222.0   157.5  
1963  23.1   54.8   237.6   1,028.8   1,266.3   163.3  
1964  22.0   58.2   245.4   1,066.3   1,311.7   169.1  
1965  25.3   60.7   255.9   1,105.7   1,361.6   175.5  
1966  25.4   64.0   265.9   1,147.6   1,413.6   182.2  
1967  28.3   67.2   278.3   1,191.9   1,470.2   189.5  
1968  31.1   68.3   292.7   1,236.4   1,529.1   197.1  
1969  36.0   66.6   306.7   1,272.1   1,578.8   203.5  
1970  38.1   71.4   321.8   1,311.6   1,633.4   210.6  
1971  38.6   76.3   336.3   1,355.1   1,691.4   218.1  
1972  38.6   78.6   349.6   1,399.8   1,749.4   225.5  
1973  42.6   80.1   366.0   1,444.9   1,810.9   233.5  
1974  42.2   83.4   380.7   1,492.1   1,872.9   241.5  
1975  47.5   86.5   399.7   1,541.3   1,941.0   250.2  
1976  51.2   89.0   421.0   1,591.8   2,012.8   259.5  
1977  51.6   90.3   441.0   1,642.3   2,083.3   268.6  
1978  47.2   92.0   455.1   1,693.3   2,148.4   277.0  
1979  45.8   92.5   466.8   1,743.5   2,210.3   284.9  
1980  40.7   93.4   472.5   1,793.3   2,265.8   292.1  
1981  38.1   93.3   475.2   1,841.8   2,316.9   298.7  
1982  32.6   90.6   472.2   1,886.4   2,358.5   304.1  
1983  30.4   90.2   467.2   1,929.4   2,396.6   309.0  
1984  27.4   89.9   459.5   1,971.1   2,430.6   313.4  
1985  32.6   89.5   457.7   2,011.3   2,469.0   318.3  
1986  38.6   90.4   462.0   2,051.4   2,513.4   324.0  
1987  44.9   91.7   472.2   2,091.8   2,564.0   330.6  
1988  46.6   93.1   483.4   2,132.6   2,616.0   337.3  
1989  50.1   92.6   497.3   2,171.9   2,669.2   344.1  
1990  47.0   88.0   507.0   2,205.6   2,712.6   349.7  
 Sources and methods: See the text and footnotes in the article in section III.  





Table II.2. Gross fixed investment and gross capital stock in Hungary (billion 1990 forints) 
 
Investment Capital Stock 
 
Equipment Structures Equipment Structures Total Index 
1949  14.7   30.3   93.4   1,125.7   1,219.1   97.5  
1950  19.1   40.0   106.9   1,143.2   1,250.1   100.0  
1951  24.9   44.3   125.3   1,164.6   1,290.0   103.2  
1952  33.0   48.9   150.8   1,190.2   1,341.1   107.3  
1953  31.3   52.3   173.1   1,218.7   1,391.9   111.3  
1954  27.9   45.5   190.6   1,239.9   1,430.5   114.4  
1955  26.7   50.7   205.9   1,265.8   1,471.7   117.7  
1956  26.0   47.6   219.6   1,288.1   1,507.7   120.6  
1957  24.4   56.0   230.8   1,318.4   1,549.2   123.9  
1958  24.3   59.8   241.3   1,351.8   1,593.0   127.4  
1959  32.9   68.5   259.7   1,393.2   1,652.9   132.2  
1960  35.3   75.3   279.4   1,440.6   1,720.0   137.6  
1961  34.8   77.7   297.5   1,489.5   1,786.9   142.9  
1962  41.4   80.5   321.1   1,540.2   1,861.2   148.9  
1963  42.5   81.4   344.3   1,590.8   1,935.1   154.8  
1964  43.6   87.9   367.3   1,646.9   2,014.2   161.1  
1965  44.9   92.0   390.1   1,705.9   2,096.0   167.7  
1966  45.4   92.4   412.1   1,764.2   2,176.4   174.1  
1967  51.1   99.0   438.5   1,828.0   2,266.5   181.3  
1968  60.5   115.2   472.7   1,906.6   2,379.3   190.3  
1969  63.8   116.3   501.0   1,975.2   2,476.3   198.1  
1970  61.6   126.1   525.0   2,051.9   2,576.9   206.1  
1971  63.3   135.2   548.9   2,135.8   2,684.7   214.8  
1972  61.7   135.4   569.5   2,217.8   2,787.3   223.0  
1973  60.1   139.1   586.8   2,301.4   2,888.2   231.0  
1974  55.5   146.1   598.3   2,390.0   2,988.3   239.0  
1975  60.3   149.0   613.7   2,479.3   3,092.9   247.4  
1976  58.6   151.3   626.2   2,568.5   3,194.8   255.6  
1977  63.8   156.2   643.1   2,660.5   3,303.6   264.3  
1978  61.0   163.3   655.8   2,757.3   3,413.2   273.0  
1979  59.6   160.2   666.3   2,848.6   3,514.9   281.2  
1980  51.3   152.6   667.6   2,930.0   3,597.6   287.8  
1981  49.9   148.1   667.4   3,004.9   3,672.3   293.8  
1982  45.7   144.1   663.0   3,073.9   3,736.9   298.9  
1983  42.3   144.0   655.6   3,141.0   3,796.6   303.7  
1984  37.0   138.9   643.5   3,201.4   3,844.8   307.6  
1985  42.9   125.0   638.1   3,246.4   3,884.5   310.7  
1986  40.4   127.0   630.7   3,292.2   3,922.9   313.8  
1987  41.5   131.9   624.9   3,341.8   3,966.6   317.3  
1988  44.7   123.7   622.7   3,381.9   4,004.7   320.4  
1989  43.3   125.0   619.4   3,422.4   4,041.8   323.3  
1990  42.7   112.5   615.6   3,449.4   4,064.9   325.2  





Investment Capital Stock 
 
Equipment Structures Equipment Structures Total Index 
1946  2.1   10.5   128.5   1,263.2   1,391.7   102.5  
1947  4.1   14.2   124.9   1,252.1   1,377.1   101.4  
1948  6.1   15.9   123.6   1,242.9   1,366.5   100.6  
1949  8.3   18.2   124.5   1,236.3   1,360.8   100.2  
1950  10.9   18.5   127.9   1,230.1   1,357.9   100.0  
1951  12.2   20.9   132.4   1,226.4   1,358.8   100.1  
1952  13.2   22.4   137.7   1,224.3   1,361.9   100.3  
1953  14.8   26.3   144.1   1,226.1   1,370.3   100.9  
1954  15.5   30.9   151.0   1,232.5   1,383.5   101.9  
1955  16.4   31.2   158.4   1,239.0   1,397.4   102.9  
1956  15.9   33.3   164.8   1,247.5   1,412.3   104.0  
1957  15.9   34.4   170.8   1,256.9   1,427.7   105.1  
1958  16.5   36.0   177.0   1,267.8   1,444.9   106.4  
1959  18.8   39.4   185.3   1,281.9   1,467.1   108.0  
1960  21.2   40.6   195.3   1,296.8   1,492.1   109.9  
1961  23.4   41.6   207.0   1,312.5   1,519.5   111.9  
1962  27.2   42.8   221.8   1,329.0   1,550.8   114.2  
1963  29.0   42.9   237.5   1,345.3   1,582.8   116.6  
1964  29.0   45.5   252.2   1,363.9   1,616.1   119.0  
1965  33.2   48.4   270.3   1,385.0   1,655.3   121.9  
1966  36.0   51.1   290.1   1,408.4   1,698.6   125.1  
1967  39.5   55.5   312.2   1,435.7   1,747.9   128.7  
1968  38.8   60.2   332.2   1,467.2   1,799.5   132.5  
1969  40.1   64.9   352.4   1,502.8   1,855.2   136.6  
1970  45.9   70.0   377.1   1,542.8   1,919.9   141.4  
1971  52.6   75.7   407.1   1,587.6   1,994.7   146.9  
1972  71.9   82.3   448.5   1,630.2   2,078.6   153.1  
1973  83.5   99.0   498.3   1,688.4   2,186.8   161.0  
1974  91.2   112.3   552.1   1,758.5   2,310.6   170.2  
1975  97.4   119.5   608.1   1,834.0   2,442.1   179.8  
1976  96.3   126.2   658.8   1,914.4   2,573.2   189.5  
1977  96.3   125.7   705.7   1,992.2   2,697.9   198.7  
1978  92.7   125.1   745.4   2,067.6   2,813.0   207.2  
1979  83.8   119.3   773.3   2,135.1   2,908.4   214.2  
1980  72.1   113.4   787.4   2,195.2   2,982.6   219.6  
1981  70.0   95.6   798.3   2,235.9   3,034.2   223.4  
1982  61.9   85.3   800.3   2,265.3   3,065.6   225.8  
1983  62.1   90.7   802.4   2,299.4   3,101.8   228.4  
1984  62.4   92.0   804.7   2,333.9   3,138.6   231.1  
1985  68.8   89.6   813.1   2,365.2   3,178.3   234.1  
1986  64.8   91.5   816.9   2,397.6   3,214.5   236.7  
1987  60.7   93.1   816.4   2,430.8   3,247.1   239.1  
1988  50.2   93.6   805.3   2,463.6   3,268.9   240.7  
1989  42.5   89.9   787.4   2,491.9   3,279.3   241.5  
1990  35.2   79.0   763.5   2,508.5   3,272.1   241.0  
 Sources and methods: See the text and footnotes in the article in section III.  
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Appendix III: Robustness checks 
 
Table III.1 reports robustness checks for our estimation of capital stock. We explain the baseline 
assumptions in the article in section III. The annual average rates of net capital formation are those 
reported in Table 1 in section IV. We run two robustness checks. First, we assume different depreciation 
patterns for both equipment and structures. Hulten and Wykoff estimated the values of the parameter R 
to average 1.65 for equipment and 0.91 for buildings.97 These values have been used in empirical studies 
and recently in the historical growth accounts of Spain by Prados de la Escosura and Roses.98 In the 
article, we assume slower depreciation because shortage economies are characterised with capital 
hoarding, meaning that firms keep some of their new equipment in storage, where they are not worn 
out as fast as they would in production. The net to gross capital stock ratio in the benchmark year is 
adjusted accordingly. Since these values deviate proportionally the same from our assumptions for both 
type of assets but in opposite directions, the combined effect on the rates of capital accumulation is 
minimal and depends on the share of each asset type in the total capital stock. Second, we assume that 
the typical service life for structures remained constant over time despite the inter-temporal changes in 
the composition of the stock of buildings. Assuming constant service life of 50 years results in slower 
depreciation and thus faster growth in structures in the second half of the period under investigation, 
but the rates of net capital formation do not differ substantially from our baseline estimates.  
 
Table III.1. Annual rates (log %) of capital accumulation using alternative depreciation rates  
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 
 Czechoslovakia 
Baseline  3.6 3.8 3.3 1.8 
Alternative patterns 3.2 3.5 3.1 1.8 
Longer service life 3.6 3.9 3.5 2.0 
 Hungary 
Baseline  3.2 4.0 3.4 1.3 
Alternative patterns 3.1 4.2 3.6 1.5 
Longer service life 3.2 4.1 3.6 1.6 
 Poland 
Baseline  0.9 2.5 4.4 1.1 
Alternative patterns 0.9 2.5 4.4 1.1 
Longer service life 0.9 2.5 4.7 1.3 
Baseline: T = 20-25 years for equipment, 40-50 years for buildings; R = 1.5 for equipment, 1 for buildings 
Alternative patterns: R = 1.65 for equipment, 0.91 for buildings; T as in Baseline 
Longer service life: 50 for buildings constant over time; all else as in Baseline 
 
Table III.2 reports robustness checks for our estimates of TFP growth from Table 2 in section IV. 
Two sets of alternative rates of productivity growth are derived from lower-bound and upper-bound 
assumptions for the share of capital in national income, or the elasticity of output with respect to capital. 
In the articleZHSURSRVHGDQHODVWLFLW\RIĮ  IROORZLQJ(DVWHUO\DQG)LVFKHUEXW LQFHQWUDOO\
planned economies factor shares are arbitrary.99 We cannot accurately estimate factor shares from factor 
incomes, since factor prices do not necessarily reflect true factor costs. In other words, factors do not 
necessarily earn their marginal products. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide estimates for TFP 
growth using a wider range of plausible values for the share of capital. 
                                                 
97
 Hulten and Wykoff, ‘Measurement’, p. 94. 
98
 Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, ‘Capital accumulation’, p. 145. 
99
 Easterly and Fischer, ‘The Soviet economic decline’, p. 353. 
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Table III.2. Annual rates of TFP growth using alternative factor shares (log %)  
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 
 Czechoslovakia 
Į  3.2 1.6 1.2 0.6 
Į  2.5 0.9 0.7 0.3 
 Hungary 
Į  2.6 2.8 1.5 1.6 
Į  2.3 2.1 0.8 1.0 
 Poland 
Į  2.9 1.9 1.6 1.4 
Į  3.1 1.8 0.9 0.9 




Figure 1. Alternative estimates for investment in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1990 
Sources: Revised estimates are from Table II.1 in the online appendix. Official data, incl. investment prices, 
from +LVWRULFNiVWDWLVWLFNiURþHQNDý665, Tables 8-1 and 8-2, p. 169, 6WDWLVWLFNiURþHQNDýHVNRVORYHQVNp
socialistické republiky 1986, Table 8-1, p. 205, and 6WDWLVWLFNiURþHQNDýHVNpD6ORYHQVNpIHGHUDWtYQLUHSXEOLN\

























Figure 2. Alternative estimates for investment in Hungary, 1949-1990 
Sources: Revised estimates are from Table II.2 in the online appendix. Official data, incl. investment prices, 
from KSH, Beruházási adattár 1950-1977, p. 32; KSH, Beruházási évkönyv 1989, pp. 13-14; KSH, Beruházási 






























Figure 3. Alternative estimates for investment in Poland, 1946-1990 
Sources: Revised estimates from Table II.3 in the online appendix. The official index is calculated from Rocznik 
Statystyczny 1995, Table I, p. 68, and converted into 1971 prices with additional data from Rocznik Statystyczny 


























Figure 4. Investment ratios in Central Europe, 1949-1990 
Sources: Investment levels are taken form Appendix II (online), GDP data from Maddison, The world economy, 
p. 478. The benchmark rates of investment per GDP are calculated from PWT 5.6 and adjusted for the difference 


































Figure 5. Investment ratios and economic growth on the European periphery 
Sources: Investment ratios are from Figure 4 for Central Europe and from PWT 9.0 (http://www.ggdc.net/pwt), for 
Southern Europe, weighted with GDP data from PWT 9.0 (output-side real GDP at current PPPs). Growth rates of GDP 
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 Figure 6. The proximate sources of growth in Central Europe, 1950-1989 
Sources and methods: Rates of factor accumulation and GDP growth from Table 1. ǻOQ7)3 ǻOQ*'3– 


































Table 1 Annual average growth rates of national income and factor inputs (log %) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 
 Czechoslovakia 
Net Material Product 7.3 5.5 4.5 1.9 
Gross Domestic Product 4.6 3.1 2.5 1.3 
Fixed capital (official) 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.3 
Fixed capital (revised) 3.6 3.8 3.3 1.8 
Total employment 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.7 
Total hours worked 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 
 Hungary 
Net Material Product 5.7 5.3 4.4 1.1 
Gross Domestic Product 4.5 4.1 2.4 0.9 
Fixed capital (official) 3.5 4.2 5.5 3.9 
Fixed capital (revised) 3.2 4.0 3.4 1.3 
Total employment 1.4 0.5 0.2          -0.5 
Total hours worked 1.4 0.1          -0.2          -1.6 
 Poland 
Net Material Product 7.3 7.3 5.3 1.0 
Gross Domestic Product 4.5 4.2 3.5 0.6 
Fixed capital (official)  4.1 6.1 6.4 
Fixed capital (revised) 0.9 2.5 4.4 1.1 
Total employment 1.9 2.1 1.3          -0.3 
Total hours worked 1.9 2.1 0.9          -1.6 
Sources: GDP is from Maddison, The world economy, p. 477; NMP, capital stock (official), and employment 
from statistical yearbooks; capital stock (revised) from Appendix II (online). Total hours worked is 
employment adjusted for changes in official weekly work hours. 
 
 
Table 2 Growth accounts using revised data on factor inputs (log %) 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 
 Czechoslovakia 
GDP per worker hour 4.1 2.6 2.1 1.1 
Capital intensity 3.2 3.3 2.8 1.7 
Capital deepening 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.6 
TFP I 2.8 1.3 1.0 0.5 
Education 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
TFP II 2.5 1.0 0.7 0.2 
 Hungary 
GDP per worker hour 3.1 4.0 2.6 2.5 
Capital intensity 1.8 3.9 3.6 2.9 
Capital deepening 0.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 
TFP I 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.3 
Education 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.0 
TFP II 2.2 2.0 0.7 1.3 
 Poland 
GDP per worker hour 2.6 2.1 2.6 2.3 
Capital intensity -1.0 0.4 3.5 2.7 
Capital deepening -0.4 0.2 1.4 1.1 
TFP I 3.0 1.9 1.2 1.2 
Education 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.4 
TFP II 2.6 1.1 0.8 0.8 
Notes: TFP (I) and TFP (II) are the residuals of growth accounts not accounting and accounting for 
educational attainment respectively. ‘Education’ refers to human-capital deepening and is the weighted 
contribution of average improvement in educational attainment to aggregate labour-productivity growth. 
Sources: Table 1; average educational attainment from http://barrolee.com/.  
 
Table 3 GDP by sector of origin of product (% share) 
 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 
 
Czechoslovakia 
Agriculture 32.4 23.6 17.7 16.3 17.0 
Industry 25.5 32.2 37.5 39.8 40.0 
Construction 6.6 9.4 8.7 8.6 7.6 
Transport and communications 4.0 7.2 7.7 8.2 8.3 
Trade 5.5 6.3 7.9 8.5 8.7 
Non-material services 25.0 21.3 20.5 18.4 18.4 
 
Hungary 
Agriculture  36.6 30.0 23.2 23.4 24.3 
Industry 22.5 28.1 33.4 32.7 32.4 
Construction 4.5 5.8 7.5 7.0 5.3 
Transport and communications 5.1 7.8 8.3 9.0 8.2 
Trade 3.4 4.3 6.1 7.0 7.0 
Non-material services 27.8 23.9 21.7 20.9 22.8 
 
Poland 
Agriculture 49.5 42.4 32.3 24.1 28.9 
Industry 15.5 23.1 30.7 33.7 29.1 
Construction 2.5 4.5 5.5 6.6 5.0 
Transport and communications 3.2 4.3 5.7 9.2 8.3 
Trade 3.7 4.3 5.2 6.5 6.5 
Non-material services 24.5 21.3 20.6 19.9 22.3 
Notes: Agriculture includes farming, fishing, and forestry. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, and 
electrical power. Trade includes both wholesale and retail. Non-material services include finance, housing, 
water and gas utilities, government services, catering, and personal services. All shares reflect 1976-7 prices 
(see Alton et al., The structure).  
Sources: Own calculations from Alton, ‘Economic structure’, Alton et al, Economic growth, Alton et al., East 
European GNP, Czirják, Hungarian GNP, Holesovsky, Czechoslovakia, and Lazarcik, Czechoslovak. 
Benchmark weights for 1976/7 were constructed in Alton et al., The structure.  
 
